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Perhaps maps make fun of us – should we trust them? Not trust them?
Or: we must be able to look at them with irony. 
Louise Bourgeois 1
Schema
A map has multiple entryways, as opposed to the tracing, 
which always comes back “to the same.” The map has to do with performance, whereas 
the tracing always involves an alleged “competence”.
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari 
A collective consideration of schema across the different fields and disciplines 
that intersect philosophy and architecture comes, inevitably it seems, to address 
also “map” and its making, as if an overlap and identity of “schema” and “map” 
might be not only possible but indeed obvious. Map and schema normally coin-
cide. But do they? And if they do, how and when? And what are the tensions at 
stake in this supposed coincidence?
The purpose of this text is to undo this presupposition, by exposing – 
through undoing – the complexity of the map, its ambiguous relation with be-
coming, and its state of intentional and necessary imperfection, to argue that the 
map is not a schema. 
The declaration of intent that invited contributions to cross-discipli-
nary conversations around schema in a series of seminars, proposed itself as a 
trigger of «coincidences, misunderstandings, overlaps» (SCHEMA 2018) on the 
topic, with the aim to make of all the different takes «a map that will trace the 
semantic regions of the word “schema” in a hyper textual form». The larger pro-
ject was therefore the production of a map – rather than a dictionary or indeed a 
schema – of schema. Interesting. Why a map?
The conceptual randomness of the dictionary’s alphabetical order pre-
sents a linear sequence that does not directly and visually make connections. 
Links are not constructed or structured, but only suggested by cross-references 
and possibly by etymologies. In a dictionary words remain loose, and a possible 
syntax is (re)constructed and reinvented each time by happenstance, curiosity, 
or research. The dictionary becomes a site of imagination and flight.
For the sake of comprehension and transmission, a schema edits down 
information to the essentials. It often simplifies and ossifies elements to their re-
lations. It reduces complexities, shading alternatives, mistakes, digressions and 
hesitations. It pushes out time. Incomplete and timeless, it is there to be fleshed 
out and reactivated each time. Schema suggests, but it does so in a prescriptive 
way, and therefore it can be followed and complied with, or transgressed from 
(or within). Thus, a new schema is generated, and so forth. Schema is prescriptive 
and normative, a set of instructions that inform a reality, or the understanding 
and the construction of one.
What is “map” then – that complex flat (but now also three- and four- 
dimensional), representation which registers, also, time, and whose complexi-
ty remains unresolved, undecided and reworkable? If schema can be «included 
among the most complex and obscure notions conceived by the Western philo-
sophical thought» (SCHEMA 2018), the only way to understand it and display it, 
and to con-tain (hold together) its multiple takes and configurations, is to make 
a map of it. Schema cannot be de-scribed or de-fined, but it can be mapped. The 
1 Louise Bourgeois, on the 
occasion of the ‘Serpentine Gallery 
Map Marathon’, Serpentine Gallery 
Park Nights 2010, London, 16-17 
October 2010.
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uncertainty of the map can con-tain it, as it can hold together also its unknowns, 
the yet-to-bes of schema. The map brings time to the schema, and thus dissolves 
it into a multiplicity.
Reality is complex and relational, obscure and opaque. Schema, through 
conventions, makes of it a «model, simplified compared to the more complex re-
ality of a problem, a phenomenon, an object, a mechanism or a process» (SCHEMA 
2018). Schema produces a simplification of reality that aims to produce knowl-
edge of such reality. It replaces reality with a form that grasps and reproduces 
of reality only a few elements, a selection of features. The unknown (part of it) 
becomes unknowable in order to produce a coded and partial knowledge, of that 
which the scheme makes scheme of. By applying the same simplification, and by 
deduction, schema could then describe, encode, in-form (put into the form de-
fined by the schema) also its surroundings. Schema is both a form and a method.
The map instead, while it needs to make simplifications in order to be 
able to communicate, aims to retain and embed its unknown, as well as the con-
ventions, references and information that make the map. It is this complexity – 
the dualities of reduction and thoroughness, concealment and display, figura-
tion and imagination – that produces the tension of the map.
In her discussion of the presence and relevance of maps in 17th centu-
ry Dutch painting, Svetlana Alpers has observed that descriptio «was one of the 
most common terms used to designate the mapping enterprise. Mapmakers or 
publishers were referred to as “world describers” and their maps or atlases as 
the world described» (Alpers 1983, 122). 6 Descriptio 
combines words – a narrative, a discourse – and im-
ages – forms, figures – in constantly changing mu-
tual relations.  The map documents what is known 
and familiar, but it also constructs and projects on a 
surface possibility for the yet unknown. Descriptio is 
both narration and inscription: it is a writing, a text, a 
narrative; it is also the recording of information and 
speculations on a surface. As such the map is not 
only representation of what is known or absent, but also the evocation and en-
actment of that which is not, or not yet. That is, the map combines given knowl-
edge with the codes and the distance of a form of representation that «allow[s] 
to see something that [is] otherwise invisible» (Alpers 1983, 122); it also specu-
lates, projects (sets forward) and narrates that which is not yet. In so doing the 
map maps, also, time. The map conceives of «the picture as a flat working sur-
face, unframed, on which the world is inscribed», and the resulting image ap-
pears as «seen essentially from within or being surveyed» (Alpers 1983, 122). 
Yet here the «viewer’s position or positions are included within the territory he 
has surveyed, present on and not external to the surface on which is laid out an 
assemblage of the world» (Alpers 1983, 133). The map maps time and records 
with it the presence and the agency of its author and reader.
Power and Time
[The map] is entirely oriented toward an experimentation in contact with the real. The 
map does not reproduce an unconscious closed in upon itself; it constructs the uncon-
scious. It fosters connections between fields. […] The map is open and connectable in all 
of its dimensions; it is detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant modification. It can 
6 Alpers continues: «[Dutch 
painters] too employed words with 
their images. Like the mappers, 
they made additive works that 
could not be taken in from a single 
viewing point. Theirs was not a 
window on the Italian model of art 
but rather, like a map, a surface on 
which is laid out an assemblage of 
the world» (Alpers 1983, 122).
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be torn, reversed, adapted to any kind of mounting, reworked by an individual, group or 
social formation. […] A map has multiple entryways, ….
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari
The abstraction, simplification and instruction of the schema, even if expressed 
with the multiple figures of the tracing, are, still, not a map. They cannot “make 
map”. But then, what is a map? What is the difference between making, reading, 
and using a map? 
The map is never only a representation of reality, as it produces a new 
reality every time that it is defined, redefined, entered, used. Never complete, 
polysemic, operative and multiple, the map remains open, and continues to ap-
proximate a referent which is simultaneously both internal and external to it, and 
which it therefore continuously produces. 
Mapping is a representation that is at once partial and excessive to its 
object and contains many (and often contradictory) possible projects: it offers 
the possibility for the partial understanding of a space, and at the same time it 
provides the grounds for the production of other from it. It con-denses move-
ments, events, transformations, and their narratives. 
It is in this unresolved combination of insufficiency and redundancy of 
otherness that the map comes into being. As it refuses absolutes, the map al-
ways contains subjectivities, it is always already com-promised, implicated with 
its maker-user, and therefore with change. Mapping then is not a fixed docu-
mentation of a site and a container of information; it does not reproduce the real, 
but it constructs one. Always an incomplete and insufficient description, in its 
incompleteness it remains open to the condensation of multiple and different 
possibilities. As it produces both lack and excess to a given, mapping projects 
(i.e., casts forward) the possibility of change. We can manipulate maps, play with 
them, question their truthfulness and the nature and reliability of their inform-
ative content.
The work of British artist Cornelia Parker 3 
(b. 1956) is in constant pursue of extracting truths 
from given representations and cultural constructs. 
These she probes and challenges by exploding the 
objects and the contexts of her projects, often literally so. Since the late 1990s 
Parker has been working on a series of projects on meteorites. Meteorites bring 
to earth the other, the alien, the external unknown, marking their arrival with 
powerful explosions that leave on the ground the scars of their occurrence. Their 
suddenness and violence bring different worlds to converge in a specific point in 
space and time, as if for an instant they could stop everything and short-circuit 
the universe. In Parker’s intentions, the series of her meteorite projects should 
culminate with the launch of a meteorite into space. An early instalment in the 
series had restaged a meteorite explosion in reverse, with a fireworks display 
set off from the roof of Birmingham’s landmark Rotunda building, in which the 
pyrotechnic mixture contained pulverized meteorite fragments that had fallen 
to earth in China in the 16th century (see Parker 2002).  Meteorite Landing and 
Moon Landing firework displays, such as the one staged at Jupiter Artland near 
Edinburgh on the full moon night of May 2009, have simulated the placing of a 
Martian meteorite on the Moon, and of a piece of the Moon on Mars. On Earth, the 
meteorite is an alien object from space, it embodies the fear of the unknown and 
3 For recent monographs on the 
work of Cornelia Parker see 
Cornelia Parker (2015) and Iwona 
Blazwick (2013).
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of the unpredictable; only its aftereffects can be mapped. Parker has used frag-
ments of meteorites to simulate their impact on the territory through the ma-
nipulation of maps: the meteorite is heated and then placed on an enlarged map, 
scorching it, erasing it, piercing through it. 
For the first of this series of meteorite maps, produced at the threshold 
of the millennium, Parker concentrated on London, and used the most conven-
tional of London maps – the A-Z London Map based on Phyllis Pearsall’s London 
Street Atlas. (see Gross 1938). 4 A heated Gibeon 
Meteorite found in Namibia in 1836 was used to char 
enlarged sections of the London A-Z, obliterating 
part of them. 5 But the meteorite impacts “recorded” 
on these maps are not “accidental” ones: hit and liter-
ally erased from the map are important city and na-
tional landmarks. Far from unexpected, the damages 
here, both on the territory and on the map, are in fact 
the results of “aimed” critical and political tools. A 
Meteorite Lands on the Houses of Parliament (1998), 
another on Buckingham Palace, one on HM Prison 
Wormwood Scrubs, one on Saint Paul’s Cathedral, 
and one the Millennium Dome. 6 These meteorites 
are not random occurrences, but weapons that tar-
get sites and symbols of power. By aiming at mon-
uments, they also dissect the map, removing from 
the conventional London street atlas those elements 
that are both geographical points of reference and 
historical milestones in the value system of the city. 
Making room, they expose the “minor” fabric of the 
city and its connective networks. The use of the canonical road atlas, devised 
for clarity of navigation and movement rather that for formal and scalar con-
gruence with the physical city, is significative. Critical, partial, polemical, politi-
cal, the mapped fictional meteorite craters question and transform the relations 
of power that the map embeds and represents, preparing the ground for another 
map, of another city and of a different society.
Parker then expands the series to the territorial scale, using maps 
of the United States of America, and selectively scorching them with a heat-
ed 400-year-old iron meteorite which had fall-
en on Namibia. For Meteorite Lands in the Middle of 
Nowhere: The American Series (see Parker 2002) she 
selects six places that may be in the middle of an 
American “nowhere”, but whose names have obvious 
associations with “hits” that were clearly manmade: 
Paris Texas, Bagdad Louisiana, and Bethlehem North 
Carolina. The small Texan town immortalised by Wim Wenders’s film, not the for-
mer home of Saddam Hussein, and not the birthplace of Jesus are hit by Parker’s 
meteorite, while a Meteorite Misses Waco, Texas, 7 where 75 members of the reli-
gious sect of Branch Davidians died in a raid by the US Defence Department. Also 
missed by the mapping meteorite are Roswell, New Mexico where a UFO alleg-
edly crashed in 1947, and Truth or Consequences, New Mexico, thus renamed in 
1950 after a famous TV quiz show.
4 Now available in facsimile 
reproduction from A-Z Maps, www.
az.co.uk/london-a-z-street-atlas-hi-
storical-edition.html.
5 The work is in The British 
Council’s collection 
“Multiplication”. The text is from 
The Multiple Store, publisher of the 
limited edition of Parker’s maps. 
http://visualarts.britishcouncil.org/
collection/artists/parker-corne-
lia-1956/initial/p (accessed 17 
March 2019).
6 The maps were displayed in the 
British Council’s group show Land 
Sea Air, at The New Art Gallery, 
Walsall, United Kingdom, 27 May 
– 4 September 2016. The show 
featured works by Frank Bowling, 
Tiffany Chung, Agnes Denes, 
Shilpa Gupta, Amar Kanwar, Tania 
Kovats and Cornelia Parker.
7 Cornelia Parker, Meteorite Misses 
Waco, Texas, 2001. Print, 47.1 cm x 65 
cm x 3.7 cm.
http://collections.vam.ac.uk/item/
O119110/meteorite-misses-wa-
co-texas-print-parker-cornelia/ 
(accessed 17 March 2019).
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The impossibility of the map
Queequeg was a native of Kokovoko, an island far away to the west and south. It is not 
down in any map; true places never are.
Hermann Melville
The map is not only as a system of representation; its making is an intellectual 
and political project of space. While the map represents a reality, it also always 
represents itself. In fact, the reality that the map renders is represented more in 
the intentionality of the map than in the image it produces. While the figure of 
the map gives us information on the lie of the land – its situatedness and layout 
– and of the activities that the land sustains, the lie of the map – its fabrications, 
conjectures, falsifications – describes the invisibles that rule society, govern a 
territory, organize its economies. 
As a “project” – the production of a never-neutral critical space –, al-
ways partial, never co-extensive with that which it maps, mapping establishes a 
relation of both difference and excess with the territory it (re)presents. The map 
is therefore a cultural project: a generative system capable of producing and in-
corporating those interpretations, intentions and transformations that may not 
be evident in the territory. 
The map does not simplify the real, but with the real it is co(im)plicat-
ed: folded and refolded over, it conceals more than it reveals, it folds in itself po-
tentialities of discovery of the unknown (the yet to be known) and the futurable 
(the yet to be). Both of these are endless, and the map too is endless in its scope, 
and infinite by definition, even before it engages in its relation of tension with the 
real. The map aims to be rich, thorough, “exhaustive”, but while it projects the 
real, interprets it and expands on it, it can never quite contain those “true places” 
of memory and identification that allow us to engage with it. In fact, if mapping 
succeeds in this intent, the map fails its representative role. The map, that is, in-
habits its own intrinsic contradiction.
Jorge Luis Borges’s short story On 
Exactitude in Science 8 imagines an empire where 
cartography aims for such perfection that to-scale 
maps become unacceptable. Eventually, only a 1:1 
scale map of the empire becomes acceptable, and 
«the Cartographers Guilds struck a Map of the 
Empire whose size was that of the Empire, and which 
coincided point for point with it» (Borges 1946). The 
ultimate map, the perfect map is the useless map. 
As it comes to coincide with the territory it represents, the map is no longer a 
representation, and becomes a simulacrum; the territory here is a reverse sim-
ulacrum. In Borges’s story the perfection of the map, the exhaustiveness of its 
knowledge, proves self-destructive. The useless map annihilates the discipline 
of mapmaking and «in all the Land there is no other Relic of the Disciplines of 
Geography» (Borges 1946).
In Simulations (1983), Jean Baudrillard examines the relationships be-
tween reality, symbols and society, opening with a reference to Borges’s short sto-
ry to explain the problematic of the second-order simulacra. As mapping reach-
es its limits and renders itself “only” material, and the discipline of mapmaking, 
8 On Exactitude in Science was first 
published in Los Anales de Buenos 
Aires, 1.3, 1946, under the name B. 
Lynch Davis, a joint pseudonym of 
Jorge Luis Borges and Adolfo Bioy 
Casares, and was then included in 
the 1946 edition of Borges’s 
Historia universal de la infamia (A 
Universal History of Infamy).
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having lost its abstractions and conventions, becomes unusable, what remains 
of both are shreds of the object-map, «Tattered Ruins of that Map, inhabited by 
Animals and Beggars» (Borges 1946). Un-coded, the shreds become territory 
(again). The artefact then becomes accessible through other forms of inhabita-
tion, by those who cannot decipher the codes of the map, which the map has al-
ready lost anyway – abstraction, codification, distance, scale.
Then it is perhaps possible to reconsider Baudrillard’s argument not as a 
reversal of Borges’s story, but as its fulfilment. Actually, falling into pieces here is 
the empire’s territory, and the empire with it, and the shreds of the representa-
tion represent something that is not, or not anymore. In fact, the «liquidation 
of all referentials» (Baudrillard 1983) here brings the representation to collapse 
(literally) onto its referent.
The success of simulation introduces what Baudrillard calls «second or-
der simulacra» (Baudrillard 1983, 1). 9 Here simula-
cra «are copies of things that no longer have an orig-
inal (or never had one to begin an & Papson 2011). 
For Baudrillard (1983, 2): «Simulation is no longer 
that of a territory, a referential being or a substance. 
It is the generation by models of a real without or-
igin or reality: a hyperreal. The territory no longer 
precedes the map, nor survives it. Henceforth, it is 
the map that precedes the territory – PRECESSION 
OF SIMULACRA – it is the map that engenders the territory».
What to make then of those shreds of the map that remain lying on the 
territory. No longer representative but accessible and inhabitable in other ways, 
they suggest that the operation of simulation is not a representation, but becomes 
generative of a new real: «nuclear and genetic, and no longer specular and discur-
sive [...] genetic miniaturisation is the dimension of simulation. The real is produced 
from miniaturised units, from matrices, memory banks and command models – and 
with these it can be reproduced an indefinite number of times» (Baudrillard 1983, 
3). This is a map that can produce a territory, it is the territory itself.
The Bellman himself they all praised to the skies […] 
He had bought a large map representing the sea, 
Without the least vestige of land: 
And the crew were much pleased when they found it to be 
A map they could all understand.
Lewis Carroll (see 2019)
Between the impossibility of documenting “true places” (Melville) and the 
self-annihilation of perfect cartography (Borges) can be found a dynamic key 
for the survival, and indeed the true raison d’être, of the map: the possibility of a 
dynamic, repeated but never identical engagement with it – a form of dynamic 
mapping the preludes the current development of dynamic, immersive, interac-
tive mapping.
A crucial artifice that allows us to recognize the map – in the sense 
of identifying, siting and experiencing the places that the map represents – is 
the definition and location of its perimeter, which transforms the subject of the 
cartographic representation into an “object”. While we experience reality in 
9 «If we were able to take as the 
finest allegory of simulation the 
Borges tale where the carto-
graphers of the Empire draw up a 
map so detailed that it ends up 
exactly covering the territory [...] 
then this fable has come full circle 
for us, and now has nothing but the 
discrete charm of second order 
simulacra» (Borges 1946, 1).
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fragments of space and time, the map records of it a synthesis that is both ar-
bitrary (the authorship of the cartographer, for instance) and recognizable (the 
correspondence with reality). The delimitation of the map helps us recognize 
known elements, thanks to our memory of forms, physical contours, routes and 
connections. 
An extreme example of this process of selection is the ‘Map of the Ocean’ 
drawn by Henry Holiday for Lewis Carroll’s “nonsense poem” The Hunting of the 
Snark (see 2019). Blank and empty, the map enables an experience of space, al-
lowing the «improbable crew» 10 (Crutch 1979, 90) searching for the imaginary 
animal to concentrate their attention on the contents 
that are delimited by the perimeter. Cleared of geo-
graphical signs, conventions, toponyms, lines, con-
tours, coordinates, of everything that might even 
vaguely suggest a measured description, the real 
world is pushed out of this blank frame and its territory becomes available to 
discovery. «A perfect and absolute blank!» (Carroll 2019, 13) becomes the per-
fect tool for the impossible hunt of an inconceivable creature, and perhaps the 
only possible entry point into this spatial and narrative dimension. 
This non-map, apparently the opposite of Borges’s map of the Empire, is 
in fact a faithful representation of the formless and dynamic nature of the sea, 
the space of the smooth that more than anything/anywhere else shows the dif-
ficulties of mapping. The map here needs to be reconceived as a live (and alive) 
mutable tool, more akin to a diagram than to a drawing. The true map of the sea 
dispenses with grids, coordinates, lines, striations, centres, and reference points. 
As such, the ‘Map of the Ocean’ is the perfect map of the smooth, as it can only 
be: an anti-figure but not an anti-map.
The anxiety of mapmaking
All of old. Nothing else ever. Ever tried. Ever failed. No matter. Try again. Fail again. Fail better.
Samuel Beckett
As it produces both lack and excess in relation to a given, mapping projects the 
possibility of change, both of itself and of its object. Operative and multiple, the 
map produces a reality every time that it is defined or reactivated. Open, the 
map continues to approximate a referent which is simultaneously both external 
and internal to itself, and is therefore continuously re-produced. 
Mapping is able to contain, or rather con-dense, movement, events, 
changes, narration. Much more than a recording and an imitation of reali-
ty, the map attempts to connect us to reality through fragments of space and 
time that need to be, each time, both identified and 
experienced. 11
Mapping offers the possibility for the par-
tial understanding of a space and at the same time 
it provides the grounds for the production of “oth-
er” from it. Always an incomplete and insufficient 
description, in its incompleteness mapping remains 
open to the condensation of multiple possibilities. 
Far from simply presenting a reality and its relations, 
the map enables them. 
10 «[...] with infinite humour the 
impossible voyage of an improbable 
crew to find and inconceivable 
creature» (Crutch 1979, 90).
11 I have discussed the dynamic 
notion of the map in relation to the 
“project” in architecture in Teresa 
Stoppani (2004). In the article I 
argue that mapping is the descrip-
tive and generative tool that is 
capable to produce and accommo-
date together the many and 
different possible unfoldings of the 
project(s). While the architectural 
drawing offers a set of instructions 
for both the understanding and the 
making of space, mapping – I 
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In the collection of essays Mappings, Denis 
Cosgrove opens his introduction observing that «[a]
s a graphic register of correspondence between two 
spaces, whose explicit outcome is a space of rep-
resentation, mapping is a deceptively simple ac-
tivity» (Cosgrove 1999, 1). “Deceptively” indeed. A 
whole universe of interpretations, imagination, mis-
understandings and potentialities inhabits the space 
of the correspondence that mapping constructs be-
tween reality and imagination, territory and projec-
tion (the act of mapping), and creates in the space of the map – the representa-
tion of the correspondence itself. What is it then that is to be mapped? How does 
mapping define its object, if the objects of its representation, investigation, cri-
tique, projection are not spaces, but the (many possible) correspondence(s) be-
tween spaces? The task is potentially endless, and never exhaustive. It is perhaps 
this irresolution that makes Cosgrove declare, only a few lines below in his text, 
that «[a]cts of mapping are creative, sometimes anxious, moments in coming to 
knowledge of the world ...» (Cosgrove 1999, 2).
More than just “sometimes”, acts of mapping are always anxious, be-
cause they are intrinsically so: 
«[T]heir apparent stability and their aesthetics of closure and finality dissolve with but a 
little reflection into recognition of their partiality and provisionality, their embodiment of 
intention, their imaginative and creative capacities, their mythical qualities, their appeal 
to reverie, their ability to record and stimulate anxiety». (Cosgrovre 1999, 2)
Anxiety again. And this is not only in the making of the map, but it finds expres-
sion also in the map’s configuration. Maps record anxiety in the representation 
of the territory. The unknown is feared. In ancient maps it is populated by fan-
tastic creatures and mythical beings: the still inaccessible opens up spaces for 
the imagination and becomes a site of invention. Later, the unmeasurable and 
uncontrollable areas of blank spaces on the map «generate and reflect aesthet-
ic and epistemological anxiety; they are thus the favoured space of cartouches, 
scales, keys and other technical, textual or decorative devices» (Cosgrove 1999, 
10). But they only conceal and in fact highlight the spots of anxiety. Not unlike 
Cornelia Parker’s fictional meteorite hits and misses, they construct an anxiety 
map.
If, as Cosgrove suggests, the «map’s pretence to stable, uniform and 
smoothly mobile knowledge depends upon inherently unstable, uneven, frag-
mentary, specifically positioned and haphazardly transferred information» 
(Cosgrove 1999, 11-12), when is the map to be considered complete, exhaus-
tive? When is the work of the mapmaker finished? Never of course. That is the 
true nature of the map: a work in progress, not because of its ongoing attempts 
to approximate an external reality, but because of that reality (which is itself in-
deed always changing) the map is not a representation, but a critical mirror, able 
to reveal and evidence also the invisibles, those ‘true places’ (Melville) of identi-
fication and memory that never actually make it on the map, and those that from 
the map ‘make fun of us’ (Bourgeois).
Nor should the anxiety be fended off. It needs to be occupied, and indeed 
mapped. Make map of the anxiety. And this can only be achieved by iteration. 
suggest – is able to con-dense 
more: movement, events, changes, 
narrations. Thus conceived, 
mapping is more than a representa-
tion: while it offers a partial 
understanding of a space, it also 
provides the grounds for the 
production of “other” from it. 
Mapping is always an incomplete 
and insufficient description, and its 
very incompleteness makes it open 
to the condensation of multiple 
possibilities.
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The repetition of the mapmaker’s gestures is a collective action of rep-
etition that produces always provisional results. But this is not in vain. At each 
of the iterations a pause of critical reconsideration occurs, where mapping re-
maps itself. This is an important moment that remains all too often submerged in 
the seamless operations of digital interactive mapping, as it performs decisions 
that are no longer directly representational but are more and more concerned 
with the selection of data that are to be fed to a performing algorithm. It is in the 
pause of critical reconsideration that the anxiety of mapping, far from failing, be-
comes productive and (re)generative.
In Over and Over, Again and Again (2010), Emma Cocker observes that
«More than a model of endless or interrupted continuation of action, a Sisyphean practice 
operates according to a cycle of failure and repetition, of non-attainment and replay; it 
is a punctuated performance. A rule is drawn. An action is required. An attempt is made. 
Over and over, again and again – a task is set, the task fails and the task is repeated. Ad 
infinitum». (Cocker 2010, 154)
Cocker’s text discusses the use of failure in conceptual and post-conceptual 
art practice since the 1960s, but the productive reading of failure, as originally 
framed by Albert Camus in The Myth of Sisyphus (1942) can be applied also to the 
dynamics that regulate and define mapmaking, its intrinsic need to fail, and the 
inevitable and constructive state of anxiety that accompanies it. 
In different artists’ takes and in diverse art forms and projects, and in 
Cocker’s analysis of them, the intentional and choreographed failure connect-
ed with repetition can be linked to the Sisyphean myth «as a way of revealing 
porosity and flexibility within even the most rigid framework of inhabitation» 
(Cocker 2010, 155). Cocker suggest that beyond models of resignation, resist-
ance, critical refusal, and absurdist readings of the Sisyphean paradigm, it is pos-
sible to see instead that:
«the Sisyphean loop of repeated failure is actively performed within the work itself as 
part of a generative or productive force, where it functions as a device for deferring closu-
re or completion, or can be understood as a mode of resistance through which to challen-
ge or even refuse the pressures of dominant goal oriented doctrines». (Cocker 2010, 155)
Can this consideration be applied also to mapping, if we see it as an ongoing 
attempt to grasp and represent (i.e. share and communicate) «an unintelligible 
world? » (Cocker 2010, 155).
«Sisyphean failure thus becomes double-edged – the gap between 
one iterance and the next produces pause for thought, the space of thinking» 
(Cocker 2010, 155).
Perhaps the map is not a schema, if schema ‘indicates the conventional 
model, simplified compared to the more complex reality of a problem, a phenom-
enon, an object, a mechanism or a process that we are used to employ as means 
of “understanding of the surrounding world” (see SCHEMA 2018). Mapping con-
tinues to tend to an-other reality, constructing in fact an alternative one as it in-
terprets and represents the given (or what is apparently presented as such). As 
it attempts to represent an “understanding of the surrounding world”, mapping 
produces at the same time an-other one, again, and again. It needs to be repeat-
ed, trans-formed, adapted, to approximate (get close); but it never coincides with.
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Making a map of schema reveals that the two do not coincide. Schema is 
many (schemata). Map is intrinsically multiple, «a thinking space for nascent im-
aginings, for repeated attempts and inevitable irresolution» (Cocker 2010, 161). 
Perhaps the map is the possibility of the impossibility of the schema.
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